印象中美国的核安全监管是非常到位的，但无忧科学家联盟（http://www.ucsusa.org）作为独立第三方持续多年对美国的核能安全和NRC的监管给予了高度的关注。2014年2月27日，他们按照自己的观点对2013年美国核电站安全和NRC的监管给予了评判。本人试着翻译一下摘要，以供大家参阅。

本人特别声明：本人未获无忧科学家联盟网站的授权翻译（也未进行校对），只是从科普志愿者的角度分享一种观点，不用于商业用途，如有异议，本人将删除相关博文；本人承诺不会应用于商业行为，也请转载者承诺不用于商业行为。

本人声明：本人未对UCS所阐述的案例做过仔细研究。该文只代表UCS的观点而不代表译者的观点。

本人观点：UCS利用核电行业公开披露的信息做出了相应的评价，在给予NRC工作充分肯定的同时对其不足给予了批评。这种批评也许存在于对事情的认识不一样，也许是掌握的信息不一样，也许是NRC和核电厂真实的不足，但质疑有助于核安全水平的提高！有专业素养的第三方参与对提升监管和核安全水平非常有帮助！信息的充分披露，第三方的独立意见等都值得国内学习！

报告摘要原文地址：http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/nuclear_power/NRC-Nuclear-Safety-Report-2013-summary.pdf

报告全文地址：http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/nuclear_power/NRC-Nuclear-Safety-Report-2013.pdf

The NRC and Nuclear Power Plant Safety in 2013

——More Jekyll, Less Hyde

美国核管会和2013年核电厂的安全性

——多些Jekyll，少些Hyde

OUR FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT CARD

我们第四年度报告卡

前言

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is charged with enforcing safety regulations at U.S. nuclear power plants to protect the public from harm. To do this it must actively monitor reactors and aggressively engage with owners and workers when it does find safety violations.

美国核管理委员会（NRC）负责执行美国核电厂安全规制工作以保护公众免受伤害。为此，必须主动监测反应堆，并且当发现违反安全规定时积极与业主和工人接触。

The Union of Concerned Scientists has evaluated safety issues at U.S. nuclear power plants for more than 40 years. We have repeatedly found the NRC to be capable of enforcing its safety regulations—yet we have also repeatedly found its enforcement to be not timely, consistent, or effective.

无忧科学家联盟（UCS）对美国核电厂的安全问题评估超过40年。我们发现NRC一直能够执行其安全法规，然而我们也总是发现他们的执行不及时、不符合逻辑或效果不好。

This report, like its three predecessors, examines NRC actions during the previous year and chronicles what the commission did right and what it did wrong. Our goal is to help the NRC achieve more of the former and avoid more of the latter—before an avoidable accident costs American lives.

和前三分报告类似，本报告审查了NRC过去一年的行动，并记录了NRC做对了什么、做错了什么。我们的目标是帮助NRC在事故影响美国人生活成本之前实现事前（控制）并避免事后（恶果）。

Robert Louis Stevenson’s classic Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde, first published in 1886, dealt with the split personality experienced by the friendly and mild-mannered Dr. Henry Jekyll and his alter ego, the evil Mr. Edward Hyde. Stevenson’s short novel is brought to mind by the apparent dual personality and bizarre behavior traits of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).

罗伯特路易斯史蒂文森1886年首次出版的关于基尔医生和海德先生的案例，阐述了友善且温和、人格分裂的亨利杰基尔博士和他的另一面——邪恶的爱德华海德先生。史蒂文森的短篇小说带给人们关注起美国核管理委员会（NRC）明显的双重性格和怪异的行为举止。

On one hand, the NRC is a fair and effective regulator, establishing and enforcing safety regulations that subject neither nuclear plant owners to undue burdens nor workers and the public to undue risks. While no one can count the number of accidents that the NRC’s efforts have averted, the trend over the past three decades in the declining number of “near-misses” and safety problems is highly suggestive that much of the time the agency does its job well. On the other hand, the NRC sometimes acts as if it is channeling Mr. Hyde.

一方面，NRC是一个公平有效的监管者，建立和执行安全法规，既反对任何核电站承受不必要的负担，也反对任何的工人和公众承担过度的风险。虽然没有人能够算清楚NRC的努力避免了多少事故，但过去三十年未遂事件和安全问题数量下降的趋势高度说明了机构（NRC）大部分时间做得很好。另一方面，NRC行为有时又像海德先生一样。

Inconsistencies in the NRC’s actions and inactions last year (2013) invoked both Jekyll and Hyde. As described in Chapter 2 of our report (online at www.ucsusa.org/nrc2013), the NRC’s inspectors repeatedly compelled the owner of the Columbia Generating Station to identify and correct the underlying causes of recurring problems with a vital air conditioning unit. But after identifying several examples of inadequate procedures and training at the LaSalle nuclear plant, the NRC’s inspectors let the owner off the hook entirely. Yet, when very similar problems surfaced at the H.B. Robinson and Browns Ferry nuclear plants, the NRC compelled the owners to rectify the deficiencies.

去年（2013）NRC的作为和不作为的不一致性让人想起了基尔和海德。正如我们报告第2章描述（在www.ucsusa.org/nrc2013在线），NRC的监督员反复强调哥伦比亚发电站业主识别并纠正一个重要空调机组经常出的问题的根本原因。但在识别 LaSalle 核电厂程序不足和培训的几个例子后，NRC监督员让业主完全脱离了“困境”。然而，当在 H.B. Robinson和 Browns Ferry核电站出现非常相似的问题时，NRC强迫业主纠正缺陷。

Note: AIT = augmented inspection team; SIT = special inspection team.

备注：AIT：扩大性检查团队；SIT：专项检查团队

The strange cases of the Fort Calhoun and Diablo Canyon nuclear plants provide further evidence of the NRC’s dichotomy. As described in Chapter 4, the NRC did not allow the Fort Calhoun reactor in Nebraska to operate until known safety shortcomings were corrected. Yet as described in Chapter 5, the NRC allowed the two reactors at the Diablo Canyon plant in California to continue operating despite its owner failing to resolve known safety shortcomings. The unresolved problems at Diablo Canyon involve inadequate protection against earthquakes. When similar earthquake protection deficiencies were identified at the Beaver Valley, Humboldt Bay, Maine Yankee, San Onofre, Surry, and West Valley nuclear facilities, the NRC’s Dr. Jekyll ordered them shut down until their owners had provided adequate protections against the earthquake hazards. Yet today, the NRC’s Mr. Hyde allows Diablo Canyon to operate despite the known risks.

Fort Calhoun和Diablo Canyon 核电站的奇怪案例为NRC的两面性提供了进一步的证据。如第4章所述，NRC不允许内布拉斯加州的Fort Calhoun反应堆在确信安全问题得到纠正之前运行。然而，如第5章所述，NRC却允许弗吉尼亚Diablo Canyon 核电站在业主未能解决已知安全问题之前继续运行。Diablo Canyon未解决的问题涉及到关于地震的额外防护不足。同样的地震防护不足也在Beaver Valley、Humboldt Bay、Maine Yankee、San Onofre、Surry和West Valley 核设施被发现。NRC的“Jekyll博士”要求在业主停堆直至提供了抵御地震灾害足够的防护。就在今天，NRC的“海德先生”却明知风险的情况下允许Diablo Canyon 核电站运行。

Giving the NRC the benefit of doubt, one might assume there are nuances explaining why entirely opposite reactions to the same set of facts can somehow both be right. The strange case of Oconee clearly shows this is not the case.As described in Chapter 5, the NRC approved an amendment to the operating licenses for the three reactors at the Oconee Nuclear Station in Seneca, South Carolina, in 2010 contingent on its owner completing safety fixes by December 31, 2012.

给NRC怀疑的好处，我们可以认为这里有细微差别来解释为什么一种事实情况下有完全相反的反应。Oconee（核电站）的奇怪案例清楚地表明了情况并非如此。如第5章所述，2010年，在假定业主在2012年前完成安全问题纠正的前提下，NRC批复了南卡罗来纳州塞内卡的Oconee核电站三座反应堆运行执照的修订。

The owner asked the NRC in July 2012 for permission to extend this deadline by two years. In January 2013, the NRC’s Dr. Jekyll denied the request on the grounds that the risk was too high to allow the fixes to be delayed that long. But in July 2013, the NRC’s Mr. Hyde ordered the company to complete the fixes no later than November 15, 2016—nearly two years after the owner’s initial extension request that had been rejected as being too unsafe.

2012年7月，业主要求NRC同意该限期延长两年。2013年1月，NRC的“Jekyll博士”因允许延迟太久、风险太高为由拒绝了此要求。但2013年7月，NRC的“海德先生”要求公司在不迟于2016年11月15日前完成整改——这一时间比当初因为不安全的原因被拒绝的业主初始延期申请还晚了近2年。

A second strange case of Oconee covered in Chapter 5 involved the NRC’s Dr. Jekyll formally requiring the plant’s owner in June 2010 to take more than a dozen measures to lessen the chances that the upstream Jocassee Dam (owned by the same company) could fail and to better protect the plant against flooding in the event the dam fails anyway. The NRC’s justification for this mandate included its determination that if the dam failed, there was a 100 percent chance that flooding would cause the three reactors at Oconee to melt down. The NRC’s Mr. Hyde then intervened to improperly with hold all the correspondence about this hazard from the public. Worse still, the NRC conducted its annual public meeting in the community near the Oconee nuclear plant in April 2011, a month after tsunami flooding caused three reactors at Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station to melt down. The exact same flooding hazard that exists today at the Oconee nuclear plant was not mentioned by the NRC—so the public was actually misled into believing no such problems existed.

第5章提及的关于Oconee（核电站）第二个奇怪案例涉及到NRC的“Jekyll博士”2010年6月正式要求核电站业主为降低上游乔卡西大坝垮坝（与业主同属一家公司）的概率，并在垮坝的情况下电站防御住洪水而采取数十项措施。NRC在此命令中的判断（依据）包括它自己的判断——如果垮坝，洪水将百分之百导致Oconee（核电站）三个反应堆熔堆。NRC的“海德先生”然后不当介入，阻止了应对公众风险的一切措施。更糟的是，2011年4月，就在日本福岛第一核电站因海啸洪水导致三座反应堆熔堆事故后的一个月，NRC组织了Oconee核电站周边社区的年度公众会议。Oconee核电站现实存在的完全类似的洪灾却未被NRC提及——公众被误导而相信这样的问题不存在。

To be sure, the NRC is far more Jekyll than Hyde, as evidenced by the improving trends over the past three decades. But with so many American lives at stake, even a cameo appearance by the NRC’s Mr. Hyde is too much. If an earthquake near Diablo Canyon or a failure of the Jocassee Dam harmed people, the NRC would be unable to look Americans in the eyes and honestly claim it had taken every reasonable measure to prevent the disaster.

可以肯定的是，NRC的“Jekyll”角色远胜于“Hyde”角色，过去超过三十年持续改进的趋势可以为此证明。但考虑到众多美国人的危险境地，就算NRC客串一次“Hyde”也是太多了。如果Diablo Canyon附近发生地震或乔卡西大坝垮坝伤害了人民，NRC将没有办法面对美国人民并诚恳地宣称它已就阻止灾难发生做出不懈努力。
More Jekyll, less Hyde is this critic’s choice for the NRC’s future.

“多些Jekyll，少些Hyde”才是NRC未来的关键选择。

Recommendations

建议
Chapter 2 summarizes near-misses that the NRC reported at U.S. nuclear plants last year. The lessons learned from the nearmisses described in Chapter 2 are:

第2章总结了NRC去年报告的美国核电站的未遂事件。第2章描述的未遂事件的教训如下：
• The NRC and the nuclear industry should study the Arkansas Nuclear One near-miss to identify and institutionalize the elements that contributed to the successful response on the part of plant operators.

• NRC和核工业应该就ANO核电站未遂进行研究，以识别有助于部分电站操纵员成功应对的要素并制度化。
• The NRC should periodically re-inspect fixes to safety problems, such as those mandated by the agency’s generic communications program, to determine whether they continue to be effective.
• NRC应当定期对安全问题的整治进行复检，例如通过机构通用通讯流程发布命令以判断这些问题是否继续存在。

• The NRC should revise its license renewal process to provide assurance that reactors are operating in a manner consistent with applicable regulatory requirements.

• NRC应修改其延寿许可程序以提供保障确保反应堆运行遵从所适用的规制要求。

• The NRC and the nuclear industry should protect against human performance impairment caused by fatigue at all times, not just when reactors are operating.

• NRC和核工业应当防止任何时候因疲劳而导致人为功能障碍，而不仅仅反应堆运行期间。

As Chapter 3 shows, such near-misses have been occurring at a rate of more than one per month over the past four years. Given enough chances, it seems only a matter of time before near-misses become an actual hit. Public safety would be better served by reducing the frequency of near-misses. The NRC should take two steps to better protect the public:

如第3章所述，在过去的4年每月有不止一件未遂事件发生。如果机会充足，未遂成为实际的重大打击（事件）似乎只是时间问题。公众安全依赖于降低未遂发生频次。NRC应该在更好地保护公众方面两步走：
• Each special inspection team (SIT), augmented inspection team (AIT), and incident inspection team (IIT) should include a formal evaluation of the NRC’s baseline inspection effort. The baseline inspection effort covers the array of routine inspections conducted by the NRC at every nuclear plant. When an SIT, AIT, or IIT identifies safety violations that contributed to the near-miss, the NRC’s evaluation should determine whether the baseline inspection effort could have, and should have, found the safety violations sooner. Such insights from the near-misses may enable the NRC to make adjustments in what its inspectors examine, how they examine it, and how often they examine it to increase the chances of finding potential violations.

• 每一次专项检查团队（SIT）、扩大检查团队（AIT）和事故检查团队（IIT）都应该组织对NRC基线检查的正常评估。基线检查应覆盖NRC在每座电站主导的常规监督。当一个SIT、AIT或IIT识别出造成未遂事件的违反安全（行为）时，NRC的评估应决定基线检查是否可以有而且必须有，迅速找出违反安全（行为）。未遂事件的审查将使得NRC调整它们的监督员的检查事项、检查流程以及检查频度，从而增加发现潜在违规事件的机会。
• Plant owners must be required to formally evaluate why their routine testing and inspection regimes failed to find longstanding problems. Many of the near-misses in Chapter 2 involved design and operational problems that existed for years, sometimes decades. The testing and inspection regimes are intended to find and fix such problems preventively, but clearly failed to do so. Plants’ programmatic weaknesses must be remedied to offer better protection against future near-misses.

• 必须要求电厂业主正式评估为什么他们的常规试验和监督制度不能找到长期存在问题。第2章中得多个未遂包括了存在多年（有的是数十年）的设计和运行问题。试验和监督制度的目的就是用来发现并预防性修正这些问题，但显然这一目的未实现。电站的程序性缺陷必须被纠正以更好地防止未来的未遂事件。

Note: AIT = augmented inspection team; SIT = special inspection team.

备注：AIT：扩大性检查团队；SIT：专项检查团队